It is shown that the independence of the continuum hypothesis determines status and properties of the set of intermediate cardinality. The intermediate set is a hierarchy of non-equivalent infinite sets. Its description consist of autonomous theories. In particular, quantum mechanics, classical mechanics, and geometrical optics should be regarded as components of the complete description of the intermediate set. Set-theoretical, physical, and intuitive notions of continuum are compared. Some practical conclusions are made.
Introduction
The most primitive inherent property of any finite set is number of the set members, i.e., its cardinality. Since cardinality reduces to equivalence of sets, it may be directly extended to infinite sets without generalization. With respect to this most basic property, only two kinds of infinite sets are known: countable sets and continuous sets.
Space of classical physics is the continuous set. All the other physical objects, including fields, can be removed from spatial continuum at least theoretically. In quantum physics, the complete elimination of objects from continuum is not possible: they are the inseparable parts of the quantum vacuum. Real spacetime continuum contains some special microscopic ingredient. This very complicated "insertion unit" is, in fact, result of size reduction of the primitive classical continuous set over some degree of smallness. But although real space has several absolute orders of magnitude (scales) at which different dynamical laws are dominating, the basic structure of mathematical continuum (the set of all real numbers) does not have any intrinsic criterion of size.
It is well known that arbitrarily small interval of the real line has the same number of points as the entire set of the real numbers. If properties of the real physical space exactly conform to the properties of formal continuum, then, in particular, it follows that an infinitesimal interval of real physical continuum should have the same number of points as all the continuous universe of any number of dimensions. This formally consistent inference is nevertheless physically questionable. Decrease in cardinality of sufficiently small intervals seems to be more natural. At the same time, continuity of large intervals is quite reliable fact. Combination of these properties is possible (consistent) but resultant continuum will differ from the set of all real numbers.
If the infinite number of points of a continuous interval can decrease and the set of the points of sufficiently small interval becomes non-equivalent to the set of the real numbers, then the continuum hypothesis is false, i.e., the above assumption (combination), which is consistent due to the independence of the continuum hypothesis (CH), may be regarded as a form of the negation of CH that can be checked experimentally.
Dependence of cardinality of an interval on its size should reveal itself in behavior of length. All large enough continuous intervals should have regular length as manifestation of the equivalence to the set of the real numbers. While length of noticeably non-continuous interval must show some irregularity (measurements, direct or indirect, cannot give a unique stable real number) or vanish (the interval turns to point and it is a composite point in contrast to true point).
The continuum problem and quantum mechanics without interpretation
Formally, the continuum problem is solved [1] but status of the set of intermediate cardinality is still unclear. According to the commonly held view, the independence of the continuum hypothesis, by analogy with the independence of fifth Euclid postulate, leads to inevitability of some additional axiom. However there exists a unique definite status of the intermediate set which is consistent with the independence of the continuum hypothesis and does not require extra axiom. The following two factors should be taken into account. First, by definition, the set of intermediate cardinality M should be a subset of continuum R (continuum should contain a subset equivalent to the intermediate set). Second, separation of the intermediate set from continuum is a proof of existence of the set and, therefore, is forbidden by the independence of the continuum hypothesis. If we compare this points, we get that the independence of CH should be understood as impossibility, in principle, to separate the subset of intermediate cardinality from continuum. In other words, the independence of CH means that for any real number x ∈ R the sentence x ∈ M ⊂ R is undecidable. One cannot distinguish members of M from the remaining real numbers. We, in principle, do not have a rule for separation of any subset with "intermediate" number of members. Any separation rule for such a subset expressible in Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory is a proof of existence of the intermediate set and, therefore, contradicts the independence of the continuum hypothesis, i.e., any rule we can formulate implies separation of either continuous or countable subset of R. Reason for the inseparability should be investigated.
Consider maps of the intermediate set I to the sets of real numbers R and
Let the map I → N decompose I into the countable set of mutually disjoint infinite subsets: ∪I n = I (n ∈ N ). Let I n be called a unit set. All members of I n have the same countable coordinate n.
Consider the map I → R. By definition, continuum R contains a subset M equivalent to I, i.e., there exists a bijection
This bijection reduces to separation of the intermediate subset M from continuum. Since one cannot distinguish members of M from the remaining real numbers, each member of the set of intermediate cardinality equally corresponds to all real numbers. It is not possible to establish a bijection as some rule expressible in Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory. Therefore, only random (arbitrarily chosen) real number can be assigned to an arbitrary point s of the intermediate set.
After the bijection has performed operationally, the concrete point gets random real number as its coordinate in continuum, i.e., we get probability P (r)dr of finding the point s ∈ I about r.
Thus the point of the intermediate set has two coordinates: definite natural number and random real number:
Only the natural number coordinate gives reliable information about relative positions of the points of the set and, consequently, about size of an interval. But the points of a unit set are indistinguishable.
For two real numbers a and b the probability P a∪b dr of finding s in the union of the neighborhoods (dr) a ∪ (dr) b
because s corresponds to all real numbers and, therefore, to both neighborhoods at the same time (the events are not independent). It is most natural, in this case, to compute the non-additive probability from some additive object by a simple rule. Since the point corresponds to all real numbers simultaneously, we may associate with the point a function ψ(r) defined on the same domain R such that P (r) = P[ψ(r)] and ψ a∪b = ψ(a) + ψ(b). It is quite clear that the dependence P[ψ(r)] should be non-linear. Indeed,
We may choose the dependence arbitrarily but the simplest non-linear dependence is the square dependence:
We shall not discuss uniqueness of the chosen options. The aim is to show that quantum mechanics is, at least, one of natural descriptions of the set of intermediate cardinality. We do not insist that this is a unique or the best way to describe the set.
The function ψ, necessarily, depends on n: ψ(r) → ψ(n, r). Since n is accurate up to a constant (shift) and the function ψ is defined up to the factor e iconst , we have ψ(n + const, r) = e iconst ψ(n, r).
Hence, the function ψ is of the following form:
Thus the point of the intermediate set corresponds to the function Eq.(8) in continuum. We can specify the point by the function ψ(n, r) before the mapping and by the random real number and the natural number when the mapping has performed. In other words, the function ψ(n, r) may be regarded as the image of s in R between mappings.
Consider probability P (b, a) of finding the point s at b after finding it at a. Let us use a continuous parameter t for correlation between continuous and countable coordinates of the point s (simultaneity) and in order to distinguish between different mappings (events ordering):
where t a < t < t b and ψ(t) = ψ[n(t), r(t)]. For simplicity, we shall identify the parameter with time without further discussion. Note that we cannot use the direct dependence n = n(r): since r = r(n) is a random number, the inverse function is meaningless. Assume that for each t ∈ (t a , t b ) there exists the image of the point in continuum R.
Partition interval (t a , t b ) into k equal parts ε:
The conditional probability of of finding the point s at r(t i ) after r(t i−1 ) is given by
i.e.,
where ∆n i = |n(t i ) − n(t i−1 )|. The probability of the sequence of the transitions r 0 , . . . , r i , . . . r k
is given by
Then we get probability of the corresponding continuous sequence of the transitions r(t):
where
Since at any time t a < t < t b the point s corresponds to all points of R, it also corresponds to all continuous random sequences of mappings r(t) simultaneously, i.e., probability P [r(t)] of finding the point at any time t a ≤ t ≤ t b on r(t) is non-additive too. Therefore, we introduce an additive functional φ[r(t)]. In the same way as above, we get
Taking into account Eq.(15), we can put
Thus we have
i.e., the probability P (a, b) of finding the point s at b after finding it at a satisfies the conditions of Feynman's approach (section 2-2 of [2] ) for S/h = 2πm. Therefore,
where K(a, b) is the path integral (2-25) of [2] :
Since Feynman does not essentially use in Chap.2 that S/h is just action, the identification of 2πm and S/h may be postponed.
In section 2-3 of [2] Feynman explains how the principle of least action follows from the dependence 
Note that m(t) is a step function and its time derivative is almost everywhere exact zero. But for sufficiently large increment dm(t) the time derivative dm dt =ṁ(t) makes sense as non-zero value. The function m(t) may be regarded as some function of r(t): m(t) = η[r(t)]. It is important that r(t) is not random in the case of large m. Therefore,
where dη drṙ is some function of r,ṙ, and t. This is a formulation of the principle of least action (note absence of higher time derivatives thanṙ), i.e., large m can be identified with action. Recall that this identification is valid only for very large dm =ṁdt, i.e., for sufficiently fast points in sense of time rate of change of the countable coordinate. In fact, this is a qualitative leap: action is not the length of the countable path but some new function. We get a new characteristics of the point and a new law of its motion.
Since the value of action depends on units of measurement, we need a parameter h depending on units only such that
Finally, we may substitute S/h for 2πm in Eq.(21) and regard our consideration as an extension of Feynman's formulation of quantum mechanics which simplifies the original Feynman's approach because there is no need in classical paths and existence of action from the very beginning.
Note that if time rate of change of cardinality (i.e., of the countable coordinate) is not sufficiently high, action vanishes:ṁ(t) and, consequently, dm =ṁ(t)dt is exact zero. This may be understood as vanishing of the mass of the point. Formally, mass is a consequence of the principle of least action: it appears in the Lagrangian of a free particle as its peculiar property [3] . Thus mass is somewhat analogous to air drag which is substantial only for sufficiently fast bodies.
Consider the special case of constant time rate of change ν of the countable coordinate n (since n is a natural number, we can always divide (t a , t b ) into intervals of constant ν). We have m = ν(t b − t a ). Then "the principle of least m" reduces to "the principle of least t b − t a ". If ν is not sufficiently large (massless point), this is the simplest form of Fermat's least time principle for light. The more general form of Fermat's principle follows from Eq.(23): since
we obviously get
where v(t) = dr/dt. In the case of non-zero action (mass point), the principle of least action and Fermat's principle "work" simultaneously. It is clear that any additional factor (mass, in this case) can only increase the pure least time.
As a result, t b − t a for a massless point bounds below t b − t a for any other point and, therefore, (b − a)/(t b − t a ) for massless point bounds above average speed between the same points a and b for continuous image of any point of the intermediate set. Thus, paradoxically, light consist of the countably slowest points having, nevertheless, the fastest continuous image.
On the contrary, a point with mass should permanently have sufficiently high time rate of change of its path cardinality. As a consequence, the continuous image of the point also cannot be fixed. This quite conforms with the uncertainty principle.
Thus quantum mechanics, classical mechanics, and geometrical optics turn out to be parts of the description of the set of intermediate cardinality. Of course, the description is not completed yet.
Since sufficiently large intermediate interval is actual continuum, the interrelations between the point and the set of the real numbers described above is independent of existence of extrinsic continuum. In other words, this is inherent dynamics of the set of intermediate cardinality.
3 Set theory and real continuum
Intervals
If we reduce some interval of the intermediate set we get three kinds of the intervals:
large continuous intervals that have length as manifestation of their equivalence to the set of the real numbers; insufficiently large submicroscopic intervals whose lengths are therefore unstable; small non-continuous microscopic intervals without length which are, actually, composite points.
Fission vs. construction
Note that the irregularity of length does not allow separation of the interval from continuum by the separation axiom scheme: the interval may not appear in formulation of the axiom property and thus integral properties, e.g. number of members, length and its irregularity, may not be used but only "local" properties of the members of the separated subset. However, this property can be used for separation of the set of such intervals from the continuous set of all intervals of continuum.
In this connection, it is worthwhile to pay attention to obtaining sets by fission of continuum. According to P. Cohen, continuum "can never be approached by any piecemeal process of construction." Therefore, parts (members and subsets) of continuum obtained by such a process should be regarded as untrue, i.e., the true members and subsets of continuum must be extracted from continuum itself.
In this case, continuum should be regarded as an elementary, intuitively clear object "given to us by one bold new axiom," in Cohen's phrase. We, obviously, have intuition of continuum but this intuition is not used in set theory perhaps because it does not coincide with the set of the real numbers with which continuity is associated unconditionally.
Modern set theory has tools only for very specialized construction of sets. It starts from the empty set which, evidently, seems to be suitable for the role of the basic element of the set-theoretic universe because it has neither structure nor properties, i.e., "emptiness" is regarded as maximum elementary object.
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It is important to realize that the main feature of intuitive continuum is absence of structure, i.e., intuitive continuum is not a construction but an elementary structureless whole which, however, may be used for obtaining sets.
Note that, in order to consider anything, e.g. a stick, as a continuous object, one should abstract from its (molecular, atomic, etc.) structure, however, one can break the stick into several "substicks" and thus produce a set. Similarly, in order to get intuition of perfect linear continuum we should abstract from any internal structure. From this standpoint, members of the continuous set, in contrast to continuum as a whole, are not real numbers (implying infinite process) or subsets of the countable set but continuous intervals, i.e., the simplest structureless parts of continuum that can be obtained by most primitive finite procedure.
At the same time, absence of structure is necessary for an elementary object which can be used for set generation. For instance, the empty set, which is parent element for constructible sets, is structureless (and without properties; note that perfect continuum has integral properties: dimensionality, length, etc). Structures appear in consequence of manipulations with the "perfect emptiness". Analogously, structures could appear in consequence of fission of the "perfect whole". Such sets, in contrast to constructible ones, are, figuratively speaking, "sliced up out of the whole piece".
If we move end points of an continuous interval closer to each other, infinite numbers of points inside the interval and outside it remain equal and constant. When the number of points of the interval begin to decrease, it means that the number of points inside the interval becomes different from the outside number, i.e., two infinite quanta of points get outside the interval. It looks like "pressing out" an uniformly distributed along the interval (to preserve a symmetry) some infinite number of points and making a sieve-like structure from structureless macroscopic continuum (the closest packing of points which smoothes out any structure).
In order to get cardinality of the next level, we need to press out the next pair of quanta and make the "finer sieve" (more rarefied structure). In order to restore structureless continuum, one would fill up all lacunas and thus smooth out the structure.
We get increase in complexity of smaller objects because microscopic structure is determined not by number of points contained in but by number of lacunas (eliminated points). It is important that these lacunas are not in the state of chaos: "sieve" of each cardinality forms certain pattern. 4 The intermediate set as a basic element of reality
Extra descriptions and extra dimensions
Cardinality is determined by an equivalence relation. Since any infinite set is equivalent to its proper subset, any infinite cardinality determines a range of equivalent subsets for which this equivalence relation plays the role of a symmetry (symmetry is an equivalence relation as well). I.e., by definition, any infinite cardinality uniquely determines a certain internal symmetry of the corresponding subset. These subsets are closed under different equivalence relations (symmetry transformations) that leads to effect of separate dimensions and, consequently, directions. Therefore, due to the properties of non-equivalent infinite sets, one-dimensional intermediate axis splits into, at least, three non-equivalent subaxes, i.e., immiscible substructures described by different symmetries. The complete description is three-dimensional. In this case, dimensionality is a classification of cardinalities. The classification with respect to length is the roughest (macroscopic) estimate of cardinality (yes, no, unstable). More precisely, length is an indication of degree of saturation of cardinality: saturated (continuum), unsaturated, close to saturation.
Classical mechanics gives only one spatial dimension: the continuous coordinate. The independent natural number coordinate is replaced by the functional of the continuous coordinate and its time derivative (degeneration).
Quantum mechanics gives two coordinates: natural number and random real number.
The proper microscopic description does not give extra dimensions if the proper microscopic intervals are regarded as points. These composite points take part in classical and quantum-mechanical descriptions. However, since the microscopic intervals are essentially non-equivalent, they themselves are immiscible and form a quantity of different objects described by a hierarchy of theories. Therefore, description of the structure and transmutation of the intervals needs additional dimensions down to the single unit set. But these dimensions should manifest themselves rather as qualitative properties (charges) of the points (in other words, they are inherently "compact").
Thus we get three spatial dimensions (one macroscopic and two microscopic) and time in the one-dimensional case. It is interesting to note that in the threedimensional case it gives ten spacetime dimensions just like in string theory. We also expect some unknown number of extra dimensions and extra theories "inside the point".
S-duality seems to be quite natural for the descriptions of adjacent cardinalities. Perhaps it is "correspondence principle" for proper microscopic descriptions. Although the persistent efforts to unify all pictures into single one (to print all pictures on the same sheet of paper) should inevitably cause drastic confusion.
T-duality, actually, invalidates the compactification on a circle: "Note that T-duality implies that shrinking the circle to zero in one theory corresponds to decompactification of the dual theory" [4] . In other words, string theory with a compact dimension remains, nevertheless, equivalent to another string theory in which the same dimension is non-compact. Hence, the main goal of compactification (concealment of extra dimensions), in principle, cannot be reached, i.e., the compactification on a circle is not the true reason why the dimensions are microscopic.
Since the description of the one-dimensional intermediate set consist of "sections", which are on equal footing, the particular main laws, directions, and dimensions of the "sections" are equally valid. Thus we get parallel descriptions. These descriptions relate to different immiscible substructures of real continuum (the "parallel worlds").
Cardinality and structure
Cantor's opinion that cardinality of a set is independent of nature and properties of its members is still regarded as indisputable. However, this is neither axiom nor theorem but only an observation on finite sets by default imposed on infinite ones. Note that, from some number of equal line segments, one can form the most complex structure (e.g. regular polygon) which may serve as a unique characteristic of the number, i.e., besides one-to-one correspondence, finite cardinality can be uniquely characterized by some structure .
Unlike a finite set, an infinite collection of members cannot be in disordered state or arbitrarily arranged. Since an infinite set is equivalent to its proper subset, it may be stated that any infinite set necessarily forms some symmetrical structure (asymmetrical arrangement is impossible).
Note that, the most symmetrical arrangement is the most probable one because such an arrangement has the greatest number of equivalent (symmetrical) states (the number of ways in which the arrangement can be produced: thermodynamical probability of the arrangement of the infinite set). Physically, this means that only the most symmetrical arrangement is stable, i.e., any infinite set forms the most symmetrical structure by itself. It is clear that symmetries (equivalence relations) of non-equivalent sets should be different. Hence, an infinite set can be characterized by type of symmetry.
We can formulate the following rule: any infinite set tends to form the most symmetrical structure determined by its cardinality.
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The intermediate set consisting of non-equivalent parts is not symmetrizable as a whole. Static symmetry is impossible and, therefore, symmetrization processes should be permanent. It would be natural to expect that the set of intermediate cardinality was an ordinary set-theoretic static set. But specific non-equivalence of infinite subsets of the intermediate set (rather incompatibility of equivalences: coflict of symmetries) lead to inherent non-statistical randomness of mappings out of small subsets into macroscopic continuous intervals which are equivalent to the set of the real numbers. As a consequence, coordinates a and b of the same point s under two different mappings, generally, differ. One expects that, at least, countable coordinate is constant. But the segment [a, b] in turn determines parameterization of the point: n(t), r(t), t ∈ [a, b] and it becomes, formally, inevitable to write: n(a) → n(b) assuming that n(a) is always equal to n(b) because change of the countable coordinate means real motion for which there seems to be no reason. However, farther analysis (second section) shows, unexpectedly, several types of dynamics. Permanent symmetrization can clarify this fact.
The inseparability of the intermediate set can be explained in several consistent ways: first, by absence of distinct properties of the intermediate set members; second, by difference between formal and real continua. We can also ascribe the inseparability to the dynamical symmetry.
(smoothing out) takes place simultaneously with the opposite microscopically originated structurization processes. The migration of points between microand macro-substructures manifest itself, in particular, as emissions of energy out of the microscopic world into the macroscopic one having structure-forming effect.
In the case of macroscopic system, the rule of maximum symmetry works like the law of entropy increase: since any macroscopic system occupies continuous region, its points tend to reproduce the absolutely homogeneous structureless continuous whole by disintegration of all macroscopic structures as inhomogeneities and making chaos of indestructible by this law microscopic parts. The submicroscopic and proper microscopic objects successfully avoid this law because decrease in cardinality automatically entails structures, i.e., finished, symmetrized states of these objects are structured. Note that the law of entropy increase really does not go deeper than large molecules and that, in pure quantum systems, chaos, in classical sense, is absent.
Pressing out infinite number of points by inexpressible rule for it, radically complicates the output configuration. Figuratively speaking, complex microscopic structures are not "sliced up" but cut out of the whole "piece" and then assembled into constructions. Paradoxically, microscopic objects should eventually turn out to be more complicated than macroscopic structures of any size consisting of finite number of parts in a regular arrangement or in the state of chaos which simplifies configuration as well. Level of complexity of microscopic objects is, in principle, inaccessible for macroscopic structures (compare, for instance, complexity of classical and quantum vacua).
Thus all the structures in our continuous universe have microscopic origin and are supported by the microscopic processes. All macroscopic processes are destructive. The only pure macroscopic object is classical vacuum which is structureless in itself.
If intermediate cardinalities are regular, then fission is irreversible: one cannot restore continuum or any intermediate interval as the union of the intervals of lower cardinalities. It is plausible because such a restoration is not a mere union of sets but synthesis of more homogeneous structure of higher cardinality from structures of lower cardinalities ("regeneration").
Practically, abstract set-theoretic regularity gives the notion of space itself in its visual sense (emptiness): structures, i.e., objects of smaller cardinalities (matter), cannot fill all the continuous superset.
A small non-continuous intermediate interval consist of a small finite number of unit sets. A finite set is not equivalent to any of its proper subsets, i.e., it has no natural symmetries but the interval, as an infinite set, should take the most symmetrical form. Therefore, if the intermediate interval is not large enough to be regarded as continuous, the most symmetrical structure it can form is closed structure (loop). Note that the least number of unit sets for a loop is three. These local formations should determine global properties of the intermediate set. For example, they may give, in large, three-dimensional continuous space. Note that infinite cardinality does not determine dimensionality of the corresponding set in the known examples. Thus dimensionality of the intermediate set (at small scale, in large) is a problem.
Conflicts
Since the complete description consist of interpenetrating parts governing by different laws, one can get formal contradiction as a real conflict of correct descriptions. In this case, elimination of contradiction in order to get consistent unified formal picture is inadmissible. For example, symmetries of non-equivalent infinite subsets of the same set conflict.
Is is already clear that classical and quantum mechanic cannot be made equivalent by any correspondence principle. Feynman's correspondence principle does not reduce classical mechanics to more precise quantum mechanics but explains why they are different and separates their regions of applicability. Taking into account that the regions cannot be completely detached, we come to important conclusion that classical and quantum mechanic must conflict. Since classical and quantum systems are very different in power (cardinality) their direct collision results in suppression of the dynamical principle of smaller system (decoherence). Such unequal and short-lived opposition is hard to recognize as conflict. And it is fundamentally hard to accept that laws of nature can conflict. Nevertheless, the phenomenon of decoherence is an explicit conflict of descriptions (control principles). It is described in quantum-mechanical terms, i.e., in terms of the suppressed description because the world is regarded as completely quantum-mechanical. Of course, this collision does not transform quantum system into classical system. De-isolated quantum system becomes microscopic part of macroscopic system.
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Implicitly, the conclusion that quantum and classical mechanics can conflict has already been expressed. For example, Valia Allori and Nino Zangh, carefully and with some fright, wrote in [5] :"... somewhere, somehow, Quantum Mechanics gives the wrong answer." They mean some modification of the Schrödinger's cat paradox. Since quantum mechanics is a formally correct theory and the right answer, obviously, exists and, in their example, belongs to the classical world, they get contradiction between correct descriptions, i.e., conflict.
However, there is a field of reality where conflicts are most apparent and permanent: the functioning of the living matter and man-made systems. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that the living matter is the region where the parallel descriptions interact by means of some interface that prevents decoherence and makes possible substantial action of very weak system on much more powerful one.
Strictly speaking, in the uniform world which can be described by a unique theory of everything (and by collection of particular theories consistent with it), there is no formally explainable origin for conflicts.
At present, origin of conflicts is concealed behind the enigma of the living matter, which is still regarded as a very rare, random formation without any special reason for its existence. Conflicts arise from imperfection of the living matter as an undesirable secondary product. On the contrary, existence of a regions of interaction of the parallel descriptions is quite natural and expected. It is clear that the region should be accompanied with conflicts which are indications of involvement of the parallel substructures governed by different laws. Since the direct collision results in destruction of the smaller description by the more numerous, powerful structure, the interaction needs special arrangement and proportions of parts (interface).
The living matter, as a region of interaction of substructures ruled by different principles, turns to be a regular phenomenon: the region of correlation of the objectively conflicting parallel substructures which results in regulation of conflicts and stability of such inconsistent formation. The regulation leads to the concept of control as an inherent property of the superstructure. In this case, control is domination of the weaker factor (instead of composition of factors inherent to the inanimate matter) which leads to increase in structuredness contrary to macroscopic destructive tendencies. Thus we get, actually, cybernetic situation.
At present, the more or less objective concept of conflict can be found only in cybernetics, 6 where it is connected, in particular, with common use of the same resources by different systems or programs that may result in incompatible properties or requirements for some objects. Note that, in the intermediate set, all substructures consist of the same points.
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Thus if the theory of everything is possible, it should be in form of a cybernetic theory, i.e., it should contain principles of "control and communications" of the substructures, which seem to be the darkest and most important side of reality.
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The regulation of conflict is possible only if very weak influence of extremely small system can affect much more numerous, powerful system ruled by discordant dynamical principle which is environment for the microscopic one due to difference of sizes and position in the hierarchy of structures. Some special interface is necessary in order to amplify the weak influence and to prevent destructive impact of more powerful structure. Such an interface is a key factor for possibility of the correlated region.
The simplest examples of such an interfaces are the launching mechanism of the Schrödinger's cat paradox and the arrangement of the two-slit experiment. It is clear that the interface should be a part of the more powerful subsystem (e.g. macroscopic measuring apparatus). In the living matter, the interface may be formed, for instance, by spatial configurations of organic macromolecules which are definitely macroscopic formations.
Most deep-rooted conflicts are due to different principles of regulation and control caused by domination of different cardinalities in different systems: obviously, a system cannot be ruled by different principles simultaneously ('schizophrenia'); dominating cardinality plays the role of control center the main purpose of which is to avoid suppression of the smaller descriptions by the more numerous ones. It is clear that such a suppression is the only reason of destruction of a correlated supersystem. Location of the control center and interface between the descriptions determines principles of regulation.
It is necessary to emphasize that the direct collision of substructures suppresses "program" of smaller description, its main dynamical principle. As a result, not smaller substructure but correlated supersystem is destroyed.
The inanimate matter is not correlated region but rather "summits" of the microscopic structures, while human society, as a region of deepest correlation of descriptions, represents model of the supersystem which should be necessarily taken into consideration: Any person takes part in several social substructures (family, economical and political systems, etc) of different "power" and ruled by different principles. The same person can take part, simultaneously, in different strictly isolated (even conflicting) social substructures. Some "programs" objectively conflict, e.g. personal interests and civic duty, but particular "interfaces" (social institutions etc.) allow equal interaction of very unequal objects (for example, man and state can equally interact by court of justice), regulations and overcoming "social decoherence." The whole is simple than its parts: behavior of a society is simpler and less intelligent than behavior of a normal person (otherwise, we would need no presidents). Society is controlled by small substructure (one or several persons) using special social "interface" (organs of government, state machine). The main aim of the control is to avoid suppression of weaker substructures and persons (their particular principles: freedoms), preservation and development of the structured society contrary to chaotic tendencies. Spatial localization of social structures is, in essence, uncertain and random (arbitrary). And it is clear that principles of "social symmetry" (equality of rights, justice, etc.) move the world.
Basic conception of reality should clarify and connect its different aspects which seem disconnected otherwise. In particular, the above observations are important for understanding of inevitability and nature of social conflicts and interrelations between weak and powerful social formations. For instance, unification of control principles and rise in direct compatibility of substantially different societies is a destructive process.
Thus level of complexity and organization is determined by depth of correlation of substructures rather than by "horizontal" extension of the macroscopic substructure. This conclusion has an interesting biological confirmation. Recall that human genome is not substantially different from that of the most primitive organisms, e.g. worms (about 30 and 20 thousands genes respectively). It should be considered as an indication that the difference between man and worm should be mostly ascribed to some deeper reason.
Note that the variety of organisms decreases with increase of their level of complexity: there is a grate number of simple organisms but the unique most complex one: human being. This is one more confirmative fact: the finite number of different infinite cardinalities decreases from very large number of the unite sets of the smallest continuous interval (the smallest interval with stable length) down to the single unite set. In case of extensive, combinatorial complexity, the situation would be inverse: the variety of more complex forms should be greater. For example, number of different words of length j is q j , where q is number of letters in the alphabet, i.e., number of complex words increases exponentially. There must be a fundamental reason for turning this rule upside-down.
Since the microscopic substructures (the "inner organism") are self-contained and does not undergo aging and other destructive macroscopic processes, they can plug in the complete biological superstructure and, in principle, remain safe after destruction or detachment of the macroscopic substructure (body).
The deepening of the correlation (growth, development, evolution) leads to increase in number and variety of conflicts (e.g. diseases) and to dominance of "vertical" conflicts ("ideological" conflicts of control principles) over "horizontal," extensional ones. Therefore, the deepening must be accompanied with improvement of the interfaces (harmonization).
Some remarks
One can see that the set of intermediate cardinality is not an empty formal concept but a real object. Existence of a real object should be proved experimentally. However, quantum phenomenology unambiguously pointing to the intermediate set was interpreted in the very peculiar way, for the most part, due to the paradoxical cast of mind of Bohr and Heisenberg's inclination to irrationality (see e.g. [6] ). Instead of finding adequate mathematical object, they initiated the chain of conflicting interpretations.
Dirac and von Neumann gave the finished view to the unfinished building without foundation. Three or four generations of physicists have grown in the building. The say now that foundation is unnecessary at all. It is natural: house where one has grown seems to the one most reliable and completed.
In fact, since the third decade of twentieth century, there is ample evidence that the set with variable infinite number of points is the basic element of reality, i.e., "the different aspects of nature are really different aspects of the same thing" [7] .
The continuum problem was stated by Cantor in 1978, i.e., 22 years before beginning of quantum era. One should agree that, historically, this is very precisely estimated time. Historical logic called for solution of the problem and inclusion of the intermediate set into the scope of physics at the beginning of twentieth century. But although famous Hilbert's report, with the continuum problem under number one, and Plank's paper introducing quantum of action appeared just in 1900, the relationship between intermediate cardinality and microscopic physics was not revealed. One of the reasons is Cantor's mislead-ing association of the continuum problem and well-ordering which has been supported by Hilbert. But instinctive rejection of the extraneous object by macroscopic intuition is more profound reason. Note that the idea of intermediate phase between continuity and discreteness have not been expressed, even in an obscure, speculative form, for about 2.5 thousands years since Zeno whose famous paradox can be interpreted as the first step in the right direction.
Many physicists did not like quantum mechanics and tried to "shut it down." But no one can shut down reality. The set of intermediate cardinality, causing the same emotions, seems to be unprotected by reality abstraction which is easy to reject. But, in fact, it is reality too.
According to W. Pauli, "The elaboration of a new idea of reality seems to be precisely the most important and extremely difficult task of our time." [8] 
